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NETWORK GOVERNANCE OF R&D: 
PURCHASER-PROVIDER AS PARTNERSHIPS IN A PUBLIC SECTOR AGENCY 
 
Abstract 
 
Network forms of organizing are becoming increasingly common, yet less is known about 
their governance mechanisms than either markets or hierarchies. In this paper, we examine 
the restructure of a large government R&D agency from a network governance perspective. 
This longitudinal study tracks the R&D agency as it implemented “purchaser-provider”, a 
popular public sector management reform with the intention of creating market-based 
competition as a governance mechanism to increase efficiency and effectiveness. In contrast, 
we found that this R&D purchaser-provider implementation behaved more like a partnership 
that was better characterized as network governance. That is, we observed a complex multi-
stakeholder environment in which a mix of cooperation and competition work hand-in-hand, 
and social control mechanisms were prevalent. We analyze both the characteristics and the 
governance of this public-sector R&D network using several business network frameworks. 
To examine the characteristics of the network we drew mainly on the Scandinavian IMP 
group’s actor-activity-resource model of business networks. To analyze network governance, 
we examine the four social mechanisms proposed by Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997). We 
find that while some mechanisms, namely reputation and macro-culture were prevalent, other 
mechanisms such as sanctions and restricted access were not observed. Through these 
analyses of a business network in a somewhat unusual context, we develop a number of 
managerial and theoretical insights about network governance. 
 
Keywords: [Business Networks; Governance; R&D Management; Government] 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public sector R&D plays an important role in a knowledge-driven economy. This is 
particularly true in agriculture, where government R&D agencies are common in many 
western countries. The rationale for heavy investment in public agricultural R&D tends to 
focus on market failure and national parity. 
The organizational and governance arrangements that are best suited to maximize the 
effectiveness of publicly funded R&D are contentious issues. Government R&D agencies, 
together with other public services, have been criticized for lack of transparency, 
accountability and alignment to industry needs. A popular public sector reform aimed at 
addressing these issues is Purchaser-Provider. Under this reform, the “purchaser” and 
“provider” of public services are structured as separate entities, and alternative providers 
compete for the purchaser’s business. More specifically, the “Purchaser” – which decides 
what public services are required - is normally retained by government. The “provider” of 
public services (or goods) are shifted to the private sector, and compete for business from the 
purchasers. Proponents of this reform argue that transparency, accountability and efficiency 
are all improved under this market-based model. 
Within the agricultural R&D context, purchaser-provider has been implemented in a number 
of countries including Great Britain and New Zealand. In these implementations, former 
government laboratories were privatized and subject to market forces. The focus of this 
study, however, is a somewhat different and unique context - the implementation of an 
internal “Purchaser-Provider” restructure by the Queensland Department of Primary 
Industries (QDPI). The reform essentially separates the “purchaser” part of the department 
from the “providers” of public services (or goods), thereby introducing some internal 
competition (FitzGerald, 1996). However, all parts of the agency remain within government. 
The purpose of this paper is explore the governance mechanisms within this context. First we 
argue that this internal purchaser-provider model has many of the characteristics of a 
business network That is, viewed from a traditional transaction cost economic perspective 
(Williamson, 1985), governance is not dominated by market-like competition, nor 
bureaucratic-like cooperation, but a fairly balanced mixture of both (Thorelli, 1986). We 
explore the characteristics of this business network using the IMP actor-activities-resources 
model (Hakansson, 1982) and in particular, examine the governance mechanisms using the 
Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) framework. We use these analyses of a somewhat 
unusual business network context to develop both managerial and theoretical insights. 
The paper is structured as follows: First we discuss the context and site of the research. This 
is followed by the theoretical background for the study – modes of governance, business 
networks and network governance mechanisms.  Next we discuss the methods used in the 
case analysis. The case analysis is organized by first exploring the R&D network 
characteristics and then examining in more detail the network governance mechanisms. 
THE PURCHASER PROVIDER INITIATIVE IN QDPI 
This section provides the context for this study by discussing both Purchaser-Provider and its 
implementation within QDPI. 
Commonwealth and State governments in Australia have been seeking to improve public-
sector management systems in the last ten to fifteen years. An increasingly popular strategy 
has been to introduce elements of a market through a Purchaser-Provider structure 
(FitzGerald, 1996). Theoretically, the Purchaser-Provider model separates the purchaser 
function from the provider function in an attempt to achieve tighter targeting of clients and 
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outcomes, improved accountability and transparency, and improved efficiency and 
effectiveness in the delivery of services. 
QDPI is a rural economic development agency bringing together the Queensland government 
and industry in partnership to increase the viability and profitability of primary industries on 
a sustainable basis. The Department’s primary activities focus on research, development and 
extension (RD&E), information services and regulatory functions. These are essential to 
primary producers seeking to increase the competitiveness, efficiency and profitability of 
their enterprises. The Department’s responsibilities focus on agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries, with a budget of $350 million and a workforce of 4000 staff, with 74% located 
outside central Brisbane. QDPI’s vision is to have a self-reliant primary industries sector 
confidently competing in a world market place. 
The essence of QDPI’s new Purchaser-Provider structure is shown in Figure 1. The first step 
to Purchaser-Provider is the separation of purchasers and providers. A statewide network of 
industry-focused institutes was established to act as providers of RD&E services for QDPI. 
Simultaneously, Sub-Programs were established to act as purchasers of RD&E (and other) 
services. 
The role of the purchaser Sub-Programs is a policy role, to set priorities for industry 
development and ultimately to decide what RD&E services should be purchased. Given the 
role of QDPI to enhance the sustainable economic position of rural industries, the above 
priorities are decided in partnership with industry through industry development councils 
(IDCs). “A modus operandi for DPI’s investment in economic development is the 
purchaser/provider partnership” (Duffield, 1997, p3). 
Each institute is controlled by a director and a board that is comprised mostly of industry 
representatives. These institutes perform services for the purchasers under a “memorandum 
of understanding”. Under this negotiated agreement, deliverable outcomes from the 
institute’s RD&E activities are specified against funding. Institutes are also free to seek funds 
from external bodies, most notably Commonwealth research and development corporations 
and directly from industry. 
ADMINISTRATIVE, MARKET OR NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
The Purchaser-Provider model, on which the reforms introduced at QDPI are notionally 
based, adopts the neo-classical economics ideology of the efficiency of markets (Duffield, 
1997; FitzGerald, 1996). Neo-classical economics sees markets as the most efficient 
mechanism for governing economic activity, where price and competition act as the 
controlling mechanism. QDPI formerly operated under administrative governance, where 
activities within firms are controlled through rule-based administration, or hierarchies, 
representing pure cooperation between actors. Below we argue, however, that the reality of 
the purchaser-provider implementation at QDPI operated more as network governance, with 
a balanced mix of cooperation and competition. 
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Figure 1: QDPI Purchaser-Provider Network 
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Business network theory provides a third perspective that may be useful for examining the 
implementation of purchaser-provider in QDPI. Thorelli (1986) proposes that networks act 
“between” markets and hierarchies, with a mix of cooperation and competition. Indeed, 
Williamson (1991) explores hybrid forms of governance from a traditional TCE perspective. 
He argues hybrid organizational forms are between markets and hierarchies for each of the 
four important transaction-cost dimensions – incentive intensity, administrative controls, 
autonomous adaptation and coordinated adaptation. As such, he argues hybrid governance 
forms are desirable at intermediate levels of asset specificity. 
While it is generally agreed that this mix of cooperation and competition exists in networks, 
it is also widely acknowledged that networks operate in a distinct and separate way to either 
markets or hierarchies. That is, networks are not “between” markets and hierarchy on a single 
dimension (Powell, 1990). In essence, it is social dimensions, rather than a pure economic 
rationalist perspective, that others use to provide additional insights. For example, Thorelli 
(1986) posits that power, defined as the ability to influence the decisions and actions of 
others, as the essential ingredient of networks. He also acknowledges the importance of trust. 
Powell (1990) argues that networks are driven by various relational concerns – characterized 
by patterns of reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions, interdependence, personal 
relationships and normative rather than legal sanctions. Ring and Van de Ven (1992) 
conceptualize reliance on trust as the key dimension that differentiates recurrent and 
relational contracts, from markets and hierarchies respectively. Adler (2001) further argues 
that trust is a central coordination mechanism within “communities”, although he argues that 
a modern “reflective” trust, rather than a traditional “blind” trust is most effective. 
Granovetter (1992) argues that all economic exchange, be it within hierarchies, networks or 
market, takes place in a social context where sociability, status and power act as central 
human motives. Hakansson and Johanson (1988) suggest a 2x2 typology of governance 
structures based, first, on whether the primary external forces are specific to a particular actor 
or general, market-type forces and, second, on whether the primary internal forces are norm 
based or individual interests. Using this typology they argue network governance (being 
external and norm based) can be contrasted from three other forms of governance - markets, 
hierarchies and organizational culture. 
We argue that purchaser-provider as implemented at QDPI, a public sector R&D agency, 
should not and will not operate under pure competitive control, but in fact as a network we 
will term purchaser-provider partnerships. The bases for our assertions are twofold. First, 
from an empirical perspective, the purchaser-provider implementation described offers 
limited competition at best. While purchasers and providers are placed at an arms-length 
relationship, alternative providers for most purchased services do not exist. Some R&D 
services could be provided by alternative providers, allowing limited competition. Purchasers 
would be quite reluctant to go outside QDPI for any R&D services that could be performed 
in-house. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where this would occur.  In essence, 
our empirical context represents far from an open market. Second, at a theoretical level, our 
argument follows a TCE logic – planning, coordinating and safeguarding R&D activities in 
an arms-length market-like contractual arrangement is too difficult due to both the high levels 
of uncertainty and asset specificity (particularly human) involved. Following Jones et al. 
(1997), task complexity also promotes closer cooperation. 
BUSINESS NETWORK MODELS 
Business network perspectives introduce a number of concepts that, in our context, may 
capture the complex and dynamic nature of the relationships between the multiple 
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purchasers, providers and other stakeholders that characterize the reality of QDPI’s evolving 
business environment. A potential contribution of business network theory in this context is 
to provide an analytical set of lenses for describing how businesses actually operate, as 
opposed to the normative or prescriptive approach of economics, which is more often 
concerned with how businesses and markets should operate. The literature on business 
networks is, however, is far from cohesive, with contributions from a range of disciplines. 
We draw on some literature from management, marketing and sociology. 
Arguably, the most comprehensive descriptive framework of business networks comes from 
the International Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) group (Anderson, Hakansson, & Johanson, 
1994; Axelsson & Easton, 1992; Ford et al., 1998; Hakansson, 1982, 1987; Hakansson & 
Henders, 1995a; Hakansson & Johanson, 1992; Hakansson & Snehota, 1995b; Moller & 
Wilson, 1995). This work has developed and refined a network approach through a focus on 
business networks and exchange relationships. A cornerstone of their approach is the actor-
activity-resource model (Figure 2). Exchange relationships are defined as business 
relationships between autonomous business units built from a history of exchange episodes.  
Four key elements of exchange are product or service, information, financial exchange and 
social exchange. Business relationships can be seen as having different substance as well as 
different functions (Hakansson et al., 1995b, p.26). The substance of relationships is viewed 
as having three different layers – actor bonds, resource ties and activity links – which 
characterize the relationship between the companies. The activity layer refers to the 
technical, administrative, commercial and other activities that connect internal activities of 
the two actors. The resource layer describes ties that connect the various resource elements 
(technical, material, knowledge resources and other intangibles) of two companies. In the 
actor layer, the actors become connected and bonds are developed that affect how the actors 
perceive, evaluate and treat each other. 
Relationships may be further characterized by varying levels of cooperation, commitment 
and trust, which affect the nature of negotiation and importantly, the flexibility of working 
transactional arrangements (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wilson & Moller, 1995). Unlike 
administrative or market control, network theory suggests that control systems are emergent: 
they take time to evolve, are path dependent and are non-deterministic (Hakansson et al., 
1995a). 
Of course literature on business networks is vast and much other literature compliments the 
IMP description of networks. A large literature from strategic management focuses on dyadic 
relationships, such as strategic alliances, partnerships and joint ventures, that can be 
broadened to explore inter-organizational networks. For example, Ring and Van de Ven 
(1994), develop a three stage cyclic model (negotiations, commitments and executions) of 
inter-organizational relationship development. Management literatures (e.g. Miles & Snow, 
1986, 1992) have explored network forms of organizations. 
Offering an alternative perspective, social network theory has extensively explored the 
influence of interpersonal networks on behaviour. While the original and primary focus of 
this research stream is concerned with individual actors, many recent contributions have been 
concerned with organisational actors e.g. (Gulati, 1998; Jones et al., 1997; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). 
Central to the social network theory is the concept of embeddedness – the social structure of 
ties within which economic transactions are placed. Social network theory analyzes both the 
quality of dyadic exchanges (relational embeddedness) and the structure and architecture of 
the network (structural embeddedness) (Granovetter, 1992). Relational embeddedness 
perspectives stress influence through cohesion between actors with strong ties. Structural 
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embeddedness perspectives stress the informational value attained through position within 
the network. 
Based on these business network frameworks, our first research question becomes: What are 
the key characteristics of the R&D business network for the QDPI purchaser-provider 
implementation, and what impact do these have on its governance. 
 
Figure 2: IMP Network Model 
NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
We now turn our attention more specifically to the character of governance mechanisms 
within networks. We adopt the Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997, p.914) definition 
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macroculture, collective sanctions and reputation. Here, restricted access is a strategic 
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Other literature complements this model of network governance. Ouchi (1979) introduced the 
notion of clan control – an informal, socially based control mechanisms such as shared 
values, beliefs and goals so that socially acceptable behaviors are reinforced and rewarded 
over time. A considerable amount of related work has focused on dyadic business 
relationships such as strategic alliances and joint ventures. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) 
conceptualize control within cooperative business relationships where “psychological 
contracts” progressively substitute for legal contracts over time. Das and Tang (1998; 2002) 
explore the typology of behavior, output and social control mechanisms, which is widely 
accepted in the control literature (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979).  In the context of alliances, 
they emphasize the important difference between formal control mechanisms (behavior and 
output) which are rule based, and social control mechanisms which are people based. They 
hypothesize that social control acts to enhance two dimensions of trust – competence trust, 
trust that the partner ability to perform and goodwill trust, trust in a partners intentions to 
perform. Conversely, they hypothesize trust enhances the effectiveness of control 
mechanisms. 
Das and Teng (2002) develop a typology for alliance constellations based on whether they 
are horizontal or vertical in type, and short- or long-term in orientation. They argue that the 
need for social control mechanisms (social sanctions and cooperative macroculture) varies 
with constellation type. Joint bidding alliances requiring the lowest degree of social 
sanctions, product bundling and R&D consortia medium levels and horizontal keiretsu the 
highest. 
Based on these notions of network governance, our second research question becomes: How 
did network governance mechanisms act to adapt, coordinate and safeguard transactions 
within the QDPI purchaser-provider implementation. 
METHOD 
A three-year longitudinal study of the QDPI network was conducted during the restructure 
and implementation of purchaser-provider. Since the focus of the research was concerned 
with understanding the contextual nature of this business network and associated governance 
mechanisms, and the how the networks operated, we were mostly concerned with a 
contextual and processual analysis approach (Pettigrew, 1995). 
For our research hypothesis concerning the dominant mode of governance, our approach was 
to identify instances of market, hierarchy and network forms of governance. To address the 
first research question - describing the network characteristics - we examined the fabric of the 
business relationships according to dimensions of the actor-activity-resources model. To 
address the second research question – nature of network governance mechanisms and their 
influence on R&D management – our primary concern was to identify changes to R&D 
management as a result of the restructure, and explore the causes for these changes with 
regard to the Jones et al. (1997) topology of social governance mechanisms. 
Case studies of two focal QDPI institutes, Queensland Horticultural Institute (QHI) and 
Farming Systems Institute (FSI), and their local networks were undertaken. Each case study 
involved multiple data sources, written histories, semi-structured interviews, observations at 
key meetings and document analysis, allowing data triangulation. Details of these data are 
provided below, followed by description of our data analysis. 
Written histories. A key individual within both the horticultural and farming systems groups 
of QDPI were commissioned to develop a written retrospective history of the past 25 years. 
These histories described developments over time, drivers for change and current issues. 
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Semi-structured interviews. Interviews were held with senior staff of each business 
organization or unit identified within the network above. In all, 60 in-depth interviews were 
conducted. Specifically, interviews were conducted with each of the five members of the 
senior management team of QDPI, the director and business manager of each institute, the 
general manager (purchaser) for each institute, the chairman and another member of the 
board for each institute, and chairman of the relevant industry development council. 
The interviews were semi-structured and followed a convergent interview protocol.  
Interviews were taped and transcribed, then returned to the interviewee for verification and 
annotations where desired for additional clarification. 
Observation. Over a 3 year period, researchers were observes at key meetings within each 
institute and their key stakeholders. In all, 24 meetings were attended. These meetings 
included quarterly board meetings, management team meetings of senior staff of each 
institute every 4-6 weeks, and some early meetings of the industry development council 
meetings . 
Archival Documents. The study focused on a major restructuring exercise for QDPI. As 
such, there was a rich source of documents describing this context. The most important of 
these included several positioning papers described the QDPI restructure and its purpose; 
charters for each research institute and their boards; memorandum of understanding between 
each QDPI program (purchaser) and research institute (provider); a broader background 
paper by Queensland Government concerning the phased implementation of purchaser-
provider.  
Data Analysis. Transcripts of interviews were initially coded using a schema developed from 
the business-to-business network literature, that captured the main constructs from the IMP 
Actor-Activity-Resources model. The coding was performed manually using NUD*IST4. 
The data was further explored using axial and selective coding techniques (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998) to uncover the nature of the model’s constructs and relationships between constructs in 
the specific context of this case. The interview data were augmented from the other sources 
of data, such as notes taken at meetings and archival documents. These data sources were 
selectively coded where relevant to the research issues and cross-matched manually. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NETWORK 
We start our analysis by examining the characteristics of the network, and their impact on 
governance at QDPI. We first examine the overall structure of the network, then explore the 
IMP actor bond – activity link and resource tie framework to guide our analysis. 
The structure of the overall QDPI network is provided in Figure 1. This figure tries to capture 
the full scope of the network. However, following the IMP approach we now identify a focal 
relationship (Anderson et al., 1994), and the most salient network relationships. In our case, 
the focal relationship for each case study is between the institute and its associated QDPI 
program.  
Figure 3 indicates the salient governance relationships and the significant multiple 
relationships between the RD&E Institutes and the stakeholders in their networks.  
The institutes and their Boards need to be considered together.  Institutes were providers of 
RD&E services and were dependent on the QDPI Program and the QDPI Senior Management 
as internal Purchaser for financial resources that were largely allocated to fund the salaries of 
the Institute permanent R&D staff of the Institutes. The salient governance relationships were 
between the Institute and QDPI Program and overtime the QDPI Senior Management Team 
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and the Institute Board.  The Institute Director was accountable to the Senior Management 
Team and also to the Board. Institute Directors largely resourced the Chair of the Board, 
attended Board meetings though could not vote and Institute staff coordinated the Board 
meetings. Most Institute Directors had regular informal discussion with their Board Chair. 
The Chair of the Institute Board communicated independently with the Executive Director of 
QDPI.  
 The institutes also needed financial resources from external funders such as the R&D 
Corporations and at times direct funding from the agricultural industry.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Network Structure of R&D Institutes 
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The Institute Board provided advice and guidance on the strategic direction setting and also 
good business practice. Industry Development Councils which looked at the broader futures 
for particular commodities such as export markets, and sustainability issues had tenuous 
relationships with the Institutes in a somewhat evolutionary process. Other 
advisory/collaborative relationships existed with other service providers such as universities 
and research institutes at different times.  
Several features of the new structural arrangements impacted directly on governance. The 
most obvious were the stronger industry orientated focus of each institute’s R&D activities. 
Stronger ties to industry based actors increased their influence over R&D activities. 
Moreover, within the boundaries of each institute, the effectiveness of administrative control 
was improved. Each institute operated under a smaller span of control. Networks of 
researchers within specific industry applications were strengthened with the new structure, 
building in the co-location and frequency of interaction known to be important for 
development of new ideas and research and development. This is illustrated by the following 
quotes: 
“… while we had horticulture people in most of the major regions, we had this 
fragmentation.  …  The institute has effectively refocused the whole horticulture 
group and brought us back together to the stage where we now have a much better 
focus on what we're doing and a much greater opportunity.  Even though there are 
five programs, because we've got so many people that are split across programs, 
nobody sees those programs as a boundary in the way they used to see the region as a 
boundary.  So we've actually managed to refocus and bring things back together 
again, which is good.” 
“The other thing is that we can put together project teams across disciplines.  For 
example, we might be putting a project together on strawberries but in that project 
team you might have a plant pathologist, an entomologist, a post harvest expert and 
even an economist involved in it, bringing their various skills to a project to deliver 
better outcomes.  … we can put a skill based project team together to deliver better 
outcome which can be taken up by industry”. 
Actor bonds 
The research revealed many dimensions of actor bonds within the overall network. These 
bonds are the foundation for the social governance mechanisms discussed in the next section. 
Here, we briefly describe some of the observed characteristics of the bond. 
The importance of personal relationships (social bonds) between actors was clearly apparent. 
Many of the QDPI staff had been with the organization for many years and had established a 
rich web of personal relationships, and the importance of personal relationships was 
repeatedly in interviews.  
“My relationship with the directors is that I try to work hard on the personal 
relationships.” 
“…and those sorts of relationships, you often exchange an awful lot of information 
very quickly about what's happening, and I really value that.” 
“I want to find out what really makes these sorts of relationships work and not work; 
and when they're not working, we're not learning.” 
The importance of maintaining and utilizing a very complex network of both formal and 
informal relationships was also consistently articulated in interviews.  
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“Where I think independence will come from will be in their ability to manage their 
complex relationships inside and outside the organization, and in what they can gain 
from those relationships.” 
“It's more about the informal relationships and the way dollars flow and the way 
priorities flow.” 
 “We try to have relationships with all of these people, vertically and horizontally and 
all the rest of it…  So there are inter-relationships at all levels, and you've got to have 
them to make it work.” 
“And particularly if we're chasing business outside, there will be all sorts of groups 
that we might decide to have an alliance with.” 
“In the longer term, I think that the director will be accountable to both the CEO of 
the purchaser and to our own internal board of management.  The board that we have 
should really represent the stakeholders.  …  That's a board of management that sits 
there, but I think probably one of the key relationships has to be between the CEO 
and the provider as in the QHI director and the CEO of the purchaser. 
Finally, the network was deliberately structured with a series of interlocking directorates and 
representations to ensure each stakeholder interests were widely represented and maintained. 
These measures included: representation on the boards by QDPI senior management team, 
attendance of institute senior management team meetings by QDPI program leader and 
common membership of the institute board (often director) and industry advisory council. 
Activity links 
As a result of the revised structural arrangements, linkages of business activities altered. 
Activity links within the areas of commodity production of each industry were strengthened. 
At the same time, links with stakeholders in the value chain from post harvest treatment and 
storage to market activities were enhanced.  Staff were now part of an organization with a 
new focus and this lead to better negotiation of activity links with external groups of 
researchers in national projects and industry consultants.  
One area of improved linkages occurred between the Institute and the non-R&D sections of 
QDPI, particularly in issues of market access. The more focused, industry-specific concerns 
of the institutes lead to a stronger imperative to establish these linkages: 
“I think, if anything, they're bringing them closer together, because there's always 
been a divide between research and some of these other things.  In fact one of the 
good things that's happened is that some of the marketers out of rural industry 
business services have now been aligned to institutes.” 
“Also for example, in the export development area, we're working closely with those 
people to bring resources to bear on export development and provide some 
direction.” 
Importantly, the industry specific focus created by the institutes encouraged improved 
linkages with their ultimate client base – industry: 
“Feedback from industry is that they know exactly where to come to for assistance.  
They've got a point of contact and they feel it's theirs, because it actually says 
Horticulture Institute, rather than I'm the entomologist from QDPI, or I'm the 
extension officer or whatever.  I think it also gives further credibility and depth to 
what QDPI can deliver.”  
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Renegotiation of relationships with external R&D funding bodies (i.e. other providers) 
involved shifting from contractual provision to collaborative processes to identify common 
goals and purposes. 
“So, again, it's a joint venture type arrangement (with other Providers) that we 
should be looking at, not a contractual arrangement.  If they paid the full cost of a 
project, then I'm quite happy for them to put whatever conditions upon it they wish.  
But while they're only contributing 20% or 30%, which is the norm, then it should be 
a joint venture arrangement.” 
Institute scientists and QDPI business services worked together more closely to plan and 
execute projects. 
“They formed teams, they then sorted out who was going to be a project leader across 
the whole lot, and those projects that they talked about were all about the whole 
range of things that were needed to get the project running. And it involved a 
combination of market development, transport arrangements, technology etc.” 
As institutes focused more on the R&D they were contracted to deliver, some QDPI 
managers in other parts of the department were concerned that the institute focus on R&D 
was taking them away from the broader service responsibilities of the QDPI. One senior 
QDPI manager wanted to 
 “pull together the senior people from each of the institutes and from the other 
business groups in each of these geographic areas, sit them down regularly and say, 
now the prime purpose here is to make sure we've got integrated service delivery, that 
we've got these projects coordinated, etc.” 
 “But also to coordinate on committees so that we're applying the best resources and 
best people to a particular problem.”  
The QDPI human resource (HR) system, acting as an activity link across the department, was 
also observed to constrain R&D management within the Institutes. This HR system made it 
difficult, and costly, to terminate staff contracts for full-time staff. As a consequence, 
quantum changes in areas of research activity that did not leverage the existing discipline 
areas of expertise (i.e. shifting human resources), were difficult to initiate.  
Research links between institutes, that is those involving cross-industry research priorities, 
were reduced as a result of the restructure. This was an inevitable and unwanted consequence 
of the new structural arrangements. While the intention of the purchasing group was to co-
ordinate and advocate cross-industry issues and priorities, they were rather ineffectual in this 
regard. As expressed by a senior QDPI executive: 
“It (the institute structure) comes with its own negative which was that we tended to 
get a silo approach to service delivery, each institute being very separate and very 
focused on its own business and very difficult to get focused on cross-industry issues 
and whole of government issues.” 
 
Resource ties 
Strong resource ties exist within the QDPI network. The most obvious is the common 
“corporate support” across the entire department. This includes common information 
systems, accounting systems, legal services, HR services, RD&E policy advice, export 
development, and rural industry business services. These resources are shared by all internal 
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QDPI actors. This has a variety of consequences, including Staff movements and 
implementing software to facilitate activity links. Strong physical resource ties also exist 
horizontally between institutes. It is not uncommon for institutes to share sites and 
equipment. This facilitates the potential for horizontal activity links between institutes. 
However, shared resources can inhibit the independence of institutes. With regard to the 
independence/interdependence of ties, one of the most important issues that has emerged 
from the new structural arrangements is corporate identity – in particular, the degree to which 
institutes establish a separate legal and/or market-based identity. Several important resource 
elements of corporate identity are the use of the QDPI name and its logo, and ownership of 
intellectual property. This resource tie has been an important factor shaping the relationship 
between institutes and sub-programs. More importantly, corporate identity influences the 
relationship between institutes and industry groups, since it is crucial in shaping the external 
perceptions of institutes. This provides an example of resource tie between two actors 
(institute and sub-program), influencing the relationship between third parties (industry 
groups). 
The Institutes, especially industry representatives, saw the financial information system used 
by QDPI as inadequate to inform important strategic decisions in a timely way. However, the 
Institutes were constrained to comply with the existing information system, which acted both 
as a resource tie (common IT resource across QDPI) and an activity link (sharing financial 
information). In practice the institutes established financial management systems in parallel 
to the QDPI system, which gave them better and more business oriented planning and 
monitoring processes. 
As expressed by an Institute Director  
“it really comes back down to the financial control. If you knew exactly where the 
money was in a bit more detail and a bit more regularly, you've probably got a better 
chance of trying to reallocate it and move it around.  And control the spending a little 
bit.”   
Shared infrastructure such as research stations, shared by several Institutes, acted as a 
resource tie. These acted to constrained shifts in R&D activities that would lead to either 
under-utilization of these resources, or lead to competition with other Institutes for this scarce 
resource. One Institute Director suggested that specific processes should be introduced in the 
management of assets which included planning and limiting access to these assets for 
particular projects to maximize their efficiency. 
“If I were running a business and I had control of ten research stations as I do now, 
and money was tight, I'd be looking at those assets and saying, which ones of those 
can I actually sell or sub-divide part of and which ones do I need to upgrade using 
the money that I've obtained.  Now, the incentive to actually do that is not there 
because if we decide to give up an asset, then we've given it up.  Treasury sells it and 
the money goes to the best bidder for a road or a bridge or whatever else might be the 
flavor of the month.  I find that a bit frustrating, that we have responsibility for these 
things, but no control or ability to manage them properly.” 
Each institute, as a provider, received funds to deliver services. Their business managers 
were now aware of the costs that were appearing on their ledgers as they were charged for the 
cost of utilities at research stations which they ‘shared’ with other institutes. The institutes 
began to review their areas of responsibility and the cost of support services which were not 
relevant to their day to day practices and to suggest reallocation of costs in line with 
responsibilities. 
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“I think we should be revisiting what costs are billed to the Institute because we're 
trying to save money”. 
NETWORK GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
We now turn our attention to the mechanisms of network governance as observed at QDPI. 
We use the Jones et al. (1997) conceptualization (macroculture, reputation, restricted access 
and collective sanctions) as the starting point of our analysis. As discussed below, we found 
macroculture and reputation to be the most important mechanisms. The role of restricted 
access was rather trivial in our context, considering that the composition of our network was 
pre-determined by the QDPI restructure, rather than networks where firms are free to 
selectively choose collaboration partners. The use of collective sanctions was not observed. 
Macroculture 
Evidence of a reasonably consistent “R&D culture” across the network was quite strong. This 
is not at all surprising given that most of the business units had come from a single 
hierarchical organization, and were still, in a legal sense, still part of the one organization. In 
fact, this culture acted as significant source of inertia stifling change, as illustrated by this 
observation: 
“ many have seen restructures before and gone on doing the same old thing for 30 
years …it’s very difficult to motivate those people to move in a different direction, or 
even have them believe that the direction is a real one” 
As such, this overarching culture acted to safeguard transactions, provided they were 
consistent with the long-standing shared understanding of QDPI’s direction. Conversely, this 
source of inertia could act to undermine any new directions considered in conflict with this 
established culture. One Institute program manager remarked: 
“The Purchaser-Provider split has put a division in the Department that wasn't there 
before, more of a  ‘them and us’.  Internally, within the institutes, with division in 
staff, some see it as a positive move to really progress and do things that maybe they 
weren't allowed to do before or do things that they see that allow them to get closer to 
their clients and meet their clients needs which they've been maybe hindered in before 
and then there are other staff who are looking at the institutes at just another change 
that's happening, that's been going on for ages and this one will go away in a few 
years' time, we'll move back to the old regions or whatever, like we always were.  So 
there's a split in the culture there in a number of areas.  So that's the first thing that's 
hindering cohesion and taking a lot of resources away from focusing on the main 
issues.  If management is strong enough at all levels to believe in this and push it 
through, slowly that culture will change and more and more people will realize that 
it's a serious attempt to be more effective in delivering client needs.” 
This illustrates both the strength of the existing culture and the resistance to change, in the 
early days of the Institutes. As Institutes grasped the challenge of setting priorities, focusing 
on R&D and forcing through changes, the staff either became more aligned  to new ways of 
working or made other choices. 
We note, however, that our research methods which focus on change since the establishment 
of institutes, do not allow us to adequately explore the role that this established macroculture 
plays in governance. 
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We found, however, that macroculture does not necessarily rely on a static, established 
culture to be effective. Two prominent observations of the role of macroculture relate to 
cultural shifts associated with the newly established institutes. 
A prominent example of macroculture was a shared identity with a specific industry and its 
needs. This represented a change from the institute’s perspective, but was welcome by staff 
as it created clear sense of purpose. 
 “I think the first thing is that it's actually focused our R&D efforts more closely with 
industry and industry priorities.  … actually having an institute dedicated to research 
and development for horticulture has given a focal point for the industry and also I 
think for the staff.  And from my discussions, certainly it's been embraced by the staff 
and I think by industry, as being a very positive development to have an institute 
which has been dedicated. 
 “I think staff morale has been lifted across the institutes. I think there’s a strong 
ownership by staff of the institute model. They see it as a “belonging to” thing. They 
have been able to associate themselves with the name of their institutes in a better 
way than they have with most parts to the organisation … A family type thing for 
them” 
This focus on the priorities of specific industries was shared across the majority of the 
network. The relevant QDPI program, institutes, industry development councils and R&D 
funding bodies and clients all shared this industry orientation. As such, this component of 
macroculture acted to safeguard transactions aligned with industry priorities, and adapted 
transactions where industry priorities shifted. This mechanism was frequently evident during 
the deliberations of the institute boards and senior management teams. 
A second example of the role of macroculture involved a shift to a more commercial focus, 
and the role institutes should play in the commercialization of R&D. This shift was consistent 
with a trend in publicly funded agricultural R&D, and had been an evolving cultural change 
process at QDPI prior to the establishment of institutes. In fact, the establishment of the 
institutes acted to accelerate this cultural change process, by establishing a clear business 
orientation. Of importance from a governance perspective, a shared view of the importance of 
industry and commercial outcomes of R&D was established across the majority of the 
network – the institutes, QDPI senior management and programs (purchasers), institute 
boards, industry development councils and R&D funding agencies. As such, viewed as a 
cultural shift it acted to adapt transactions – albeit slowly and imperfectly due to the inertia 
discussed above. Indeed, the modified macroculture also acted to safeguard transactions. 
Reputation 
Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) describe reputation as an estimation of one’s character 
skills, reliability and other attributes and they contend that “reputation is important to 
exchanges and is important under exchange conditions of uncertainty and customization ( 
p932). Kay (1995) argues that the reputation of a firm is created in a specific market. 
Matthews & Shulman (Forthcoming) contend that in an R&D context, the reputation of the 
firm has a close relationship between the reputation of the scientists and the reputation of the 
organization with consequences for relationships with stakeholders and funding bodies.  In 
QDPI, the reputation of individual scientists had previously been well established and the 
formation of specific business groups built on the previous good reputations and thrust many 
into a more major role, providing opportunities to highlight the work of these scientists. 
Indeed, the good reputation of QDPI as a research and development organization was one 
reason one person nominated for the Institute Board. 
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“The fact that QDPI had gone from being a relatively good performer, but not an 
outstanding one, to being the best in Australia by far.  The best of the State 
departments by far….. So I saw QDPI as a really outstanding body.” 
Since the creation of institutes, some project teams have become preferred suppliers of R&D, 
and on the basis of their reputations, have received direct invitations from external funding 
organizations to carry out specific RD&E programs. Other project teams have increased their 
sources of R&D funding from R&D corporations.  
  “The nature of a firm’s reputation is of course competitive and reflects the context of the 
organization, its relationships with others, closeness to the customer and reputation for the 
delivery of quality products and processes.  The R&D institutes recognized that as part of the 
competitive world they operate in, considerable attention and resources devoted to being seen 
to deliver on key performance indicators were needed to maintain one’s reputation. At the 
level of the project, staff also recognized that it was their reputation as scientists that needed 
to be developed, maintained and communicated for receiving funding (Matthews & Shulman, 
forthcoming, p5).  
“Reputations have economic consequences for participants in network governance” (Jones et 
al., 1997). In a R&D context the consequences are good performance, repeat business and 
potential for new projects. The importance of reputation was clear to institute staff, the 
management team and the Board.   
 “ the fact that we are so successful in getting projects up with R&D Corporation and 
things like that, that we are seen as very relevant.  The R&D Corporation sees (our 
institute) as "the leader in Australia".  And they use a lot of the things and even our 
operational things, things that our project manager does and the way we report our 
milestones and the way we interact with them, they continually say, we wish we could 
get the other States to be as good as Queensland.  So from their point of view, it's 
given them the confidence to put Federal government money with us, they're getting 
the outcomes, they're getting the deliverables, they can relate to a specific focal point 
and that suits them down to the ground.  I think the same is true of international 
projects.  Again it gives them a focal point, we are the repository of all the scientific 
good that resides in horticulture in Queensland.  You want to know something about 
horticulture in Queensland, you go to our institute.” 
The development and nurturing of the reputation of the institute as an organization focused 
on the needs of industry and targeting new markets. Each institute was the engine in which 
the research and development was planned, shaped and implemented  and reputation was a 
driver in the Institute’s relationships internally with QDPI, and with external funding bodies. 
It was also both a driver and a response to performing in a business like manner, such as 
balancing budgets as well as the delivery of R&D outcomes, meeting milestones and “doing 
good science”. As such, reputation acted as an important safeguard of transactions from the 
perspective of purchasers, R&D funding bodies and Institute Boards. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We present a case study of the restructure of QDPI, a public sector R&D agency, in which a 
number of R&D institutes were established under a Purchaser-Provider type reform.  We 
analyze the structure and governance from a network perspective. The R&D network 
characteristics are examined using the IMP actor-activity-resources model, revealing 
interesting insights into managing R&D in this context. Both actor bonds and activity links 
within vertical industry domains acted to facilitate both strategic alignment and operational 
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effectiveness of R&D and cross-functional integration. This was not true of horizontal, cross-
industry initiatives. Resource links acted as a substantial barrier to change. 
Finally, network governance mechanisms are investigated more closely. We find evidence 
that macroculture played a role in adapting R&D to shifting industry priorities, safeguarding 
that R&D outcomes met industry needs, and enhancing a shifting emphasis towards an 
increased commercial focus. Reputation played a substantial role in safeguarding delivery of 
R&D outcomes, meeting milestones and R&D quality. The generalisability of these 
observations to other R&D networks provides an interesting avenue for future work. 
Restricted access and collective sanctions are not employed in our context. It is an interesting 
avenue for future empirical work to explore whether or not restricted access and collective 
sanctions are employed in other R&D network contexts. 
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